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STATEMENT OF PURPOSE MONTEREY CA 93943-5101
Through the past several years, the Navy has been reexamining the way
that constructed facilities are delivered to internal customers. The Resident
Officer In Charge of Construction (ROICC) offices, manned by Civil Service
employees and Naval Officers, currently manages the construction contracts for
the Naval Facilities Engineering Command (NAVFAC). The use of private
sector construction management service by contract has not been examined in
detail by the Navy as an alternative to this practice. This paper will examine
whether outsourcing of traditional ROICC office duties to civilian contractors is
feasible and what benefits and risks are found by doing so. Different contracting
methods and approaches to implementing outsourcing of construction
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Faced with shrinking budgets and decreases in personnel, government
organizations have been forced to reexamine ways of doing business.
Reengineering, outsourcing and privatization are all being examined as
alternatives that could change organizations into more cost effective, smaller
entities that are capable of delivering the high levels of service that customers
demand. The Navy is no exception to this trend of reductions. Cutbacks have
occurred in the Navy in all departments and still continue. Although the
number of federal employees has decreased, workload in some cases has
increased. An area of the Navy where this is evident is at the Naval Facilities
Engineering Command (NAVFACENGCOM, hereafter referred to as NAVFAC).
NAVFAC acts as the construction management arm of the Navy in order
to provide base facility support for the fleet. All base construction contract
management is handled by NAVFAC. The Resident Officer in Charge of
Construction (ROICC) offices oversee this construction and are staffed with
NAVFAC employees and Civil Engineer Corps (CEC) officers. ROICC offices

must provide construction management services in spite of increasing workloads
with fewer and fewer personnel.
This paper examines outsourcing of construction management for the
ROICC offices as a potential solution to the problem of increased workloads and
decreases in personnel. By outsourcing ROICC office functions, NAVFAC can
gain the advantages offered by the outsourcing process and be able to meet
current levels of excellence in spite of declining numbers of personnel. This
paper addresses the process of outsourcing, benefits, and methods for instituting
change at NAVFAC.
Chapter II addresses outsourcing in a general overview. Outsourcing is
defined and examined in relation to private companies, current DOD practices
and DOD requirements for outsourcing departmental functions.
Chapter III examines the current process for construction management in
NAVFAC and at the ROICC offices. Advantages for outsourcing at the ROICC
office level are presented, including the feasibility of outsourcing ROICC office
functions to the private sector.
Chapter IV examines alternate approaches to contracting for construction
management and explores implementation of private sector services for
construction management.
Chapter V contains the conclusions drawn from the research done for this




Faced with today's decreasing budget constraints and high expectations
from customers for innovative and cost-saving alternatives, many organizations
have begun to look at different ways of doing business. One such alternative is
outsourcing. Organizations first saw outsourcing as a way to cut costs. By
going outside the organization to obtain services that were not a part of an
organization's core competency, companies hoped to decrease their own
structure and focus the organization more on core competencies. Outsourcing
was seen as way of not only reducing the sheer size of an organization, but also
allowing for greater flexibility in meeting customer demands and project goals.
An organization could now go outside of itself to reap the benefits of outside
expertise in several different areas.
Outsourcing Definition and Other Models
Outsourcing, for the purposes of this paper, is defined as a service,
previously delivered by internal employees, provided by an outside organization
or private company. Funding for outsourcing is provided by the internal

organization for whom the services are provided. This is to distinguish
outsourcing from "privatization" which typically is funded from private
financial institutions instead of internal government mechanisms. Privatization
is also typically associated with Build, Operate, and Transfer (B-O-T) projects,
which comprise an alternate method of delivery of a specific service. B-O-T
projects are not discussed in this paper in terms of the supply of construction
management services.
There are other alternate deliveries of services that are not considered in
detail in this report. A common example of another alternate delivery is going
outside of a government organization to a separate government organization to
provide the same service [Finley 1989]. For example, if the Navy went to the
Army Corps of Engineers to monitor construction of an office building instead of
using NAVFAC, this could be classified as an alternate delivery of the same
service that NAVFAC provides. While the issues of outsourcing are relatively
the same, this report will examine the more extreme approach of outsourcing to
private firms instead of other government agencies. This distinction between
alternate delivery and outsourcing is important because outsourcing introduces
competition in the market place and can result in stimulating better performance.
However, it can also be argued that competition will exist between government
entities increasing performance, but competition in between government

agencies could also be more of a detriment than a positive factor for interagency
relations and cooperation.
Reasons for Outsourcing
The reasons for outsourcing vary from organization to organization.
However, parallels can be drawn from outsourcing purposes in the private sector
and in governmental sectors. When decisions to outsource in all cases are
carefully planned and analyzed, confusion and inefficiencies can be minimized
when outsourcing is instituted. Outsourcing typically is a tool for making large
changes in an organization and can have disastrous results if not carefully
planned and organized. However, if properly planned and organized,
outsourcing can change an inefficient, inflexible organization into an adaptable
model of efficiency.
According to the Outsourcing Institute, some of the reasons why private
companies outsource include: to improve company focus and free resources for
that focus; to allow for access to world-class capabilities; to share inherent risks;
to reduce and control operating costs; and to provide resources if the resources
are not available internally. Other reasons exist for outsourcing, but these are the
most commonly cited in industry. These reasons can easily be applied to
governmental services, including construction management.

Outsourcing can improve a company by allowing an organization to focus
on broader issues while allowing the operational details to be assumed by an
outside expert. "Outsourcing is an organizational-shaping management tool
which can lead to a clearer more effective focus on meeting the customer's
needs." ["Top Ten Reasons Companies Outsource" 1996] By outsourcing the
day-to-day contract management of construction projects, for example, an
organization can effectively turn its attention to the broader scope of the
organization's mission and ever-changing customer requirements.
With downsizing, or 'right-sizing', organizations are faced more and more
with reduced personnel and limited resources to accomplish their mission. By
outsourcing functions, an organization can redirect its resources, i.e. personnel,
from non-core activities toward activities which can have a greater return in
serving the customers. This freeing of resources can create greater
organizational flexibility allowing organizations to better adapt to changing
demands.
By outsourcing, an organization can take advantage of emerging
technologies, through the use of outside providers, without having to undergo
institutional change and education. Typically, private firms are more willing to
take risks with emerging technologies to reap the benefits. Government
organizations, because of their sheer size, are hesitant to undertake unproven
technologies because of cost of implementation and training over a wide area of

responsibility. For example, in construction management, private companies can
offer world class expertise and access to the latest in management technologies.
Typically the government would not be able to implement these emerging
technologies by itself due to policy limitations and implementation costs.
By outsourcing a service, organizations can share the risks inherent in a
function with an outside company. When an organization retains a non-core
service, they also bare all the risk associated with providing and maintaining that
service. If that service is outsourced to an outside company, then the outside
company providing the service will assume a portion of the risk. The amount of
risk assumed depends on the contracting methods and the service provided, but
regardless the organization can now share the risks with an outside source.
Perhaps the single greatest reason for outsourcing in the private sector is
to reduce or control operating costs. By outsourcing a service, organizations can
hope to take advantage of another company's business initiatives and save costs
in providing the service. Also, by contracting for the service, an organization can
have a greater control over the costs of the service in general. By monitoring
costs of an outside company, inefficiencies can be noted and corrected through
contractual actions. However, in internal functions it can be difficult to identify
inefficient or cost ineffective practices; and once identified, correction can take
long periods of time.

Finally, the most obvious reason to outsource is because a company lacks
the personnel to carry out the service. The best application of this in the
government arena is due to shifting requirements causing peaks and valleys in
workloads. Rather than hiring temporary employees or trying to shift civil
service employees to meet changing demands, an outsourced service can shift
automatically to changing needs without affecting internal organizations or
staffing.
Outsourcing Pitfalls
According to the Outsourcing Institute there are three main warning signs
for planning that could lead to an unsuccessful outsourcing venture. They are:
1) finance, legal, or contractors dominating the purchasing process; 2) failure to
pre-qualify contractors based on past performance; and 3) short-term benefits
dominating the decision to outsource. ["Avoiding Pitfalls" 1996]
The first suggests that business managers should drive the outsourcing
process with clear and measurable objectives. The purchasing process should
follow a well established set of rules and regulations, and relationships with
contractors should be built on win-win attitudes. Of course, finance and legal
issues have to play a significant role in the outsourcing process, but the ultimate
decision to outsource should be based on a variety of factors including, not only
finance and legal, but sound business objectives and decisions.

The second refers to the actual selection process of contractors to provide
the service. Contractor's past performance, qualifications and prior contracting
relationships should be a factor in selection for the outsourced service. The
Outsourcing Institute goes so far to say that contractors should be prequalified
before the Request for Proposal (RFP) is distributed.
The final potential downfall involves an over-emphasis on meeting short-
term goals in the decision to outsource. The strategic reasons to outsource
should emphasize the long term goals and objectives while meeting short term
goals; there should not be an emphasis on short term goals alone. This is true of
any planning process. Organizational changes that significantly change how
services are delivered should be considered for the long term applications, not
the short term applications.
In short, many factors need to be considered when deciding to outsource
an internal function to external sources. Reasons to outsource a function should
be based on sound business judgments involving financing, resource availability,
outside expertise available in the marketplace, legal issues, internal controls and
specific definitions of what is to be outsourced and how.
Outsourcing for the DOD
"The Vice President's National Performance Review initiatives and
government policies to reduce the size of the federal workforce have challenged

federal agencies to reengineer their business practices to focus on mission-related
activities, cut costs, and improve customer service." ["Committee on
Outsourcing" 1997]
Support activities in the Department of Defense (DOD) represent a
significant portion of the total defense budget. In fiscal year 1996, the DOD will
spend approximately $ 93 billion on operations and maintenance. ["Improving
the Combat Edge" 1996] Like most companies and organizations, the DOD is
determining ways to both reduce costs and improve the overall performance of
their support activities.
With the end of the Cold War, the DOD has tailored its force structure and
budget to reflect continually changing security threats. The DOD's current force
structure is roughly 30 percent smaller than the 1980s and the budget has
decreased from a peak in 1985 by 60 percent. ["Improving the Combat Edge"
1996] The DOD has implemented three significant initiatives to reduce costs and
improve performance. The first initiative involved the Base Realignment and
Closure (BRAC) process. The second initiative was the streamlining of the
acquisition process through acquisition reform aimed at easing the cumbersome
acquisition process. Finally, the DOD is beginning a review of support
operations to determine where competitive forces (outside or internal) can
improve performance and lower costs. Outsourcing offers an excellent method
of meeting the third initiative.
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The Deputy Secretary of Defense established a comprehensive, ongoing
DOD-wide review to identify non-core functions that could be outsourced.
According to DOD guidelines, only those activities meeting the following three
criteria should be considered for outsourcing:
1. Private sector firms must be able to perform the activity. The DOD
will not outsource activities which constitute core capabilities.
2. A competitive market must exist for the activity.
3. Outsourcing of the activity must result in the best value for the
government. Activities will be considered for outsourcing only when
the private sector can improve performance or lower costs in the
context of long-term competition.
Through prior outsourcing initiatives, the DOD's experience has
demonstrated that competitive outsourcing has resulted in significant savings
and increased readiness. Cost comparisons conducted between 1978 and 1994
show a savings of about $ 1.5 billion a year. On average, these competitions have
resulted in a reduction of annual operating costs by 31 percent with private
sector entities winning about half of the competitions (government entities won
the other half). ["Improving the Combat Edge" 1996]
The benefits have stretched across a wide range of support activities in the
DOD. Currently, the DOD outsources approximately 25 percent of base
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commercial activities, 28 percent of depot maintenance, 10 percent of finance and
accounting, 70 percent of Army aviation training, 45 percent of surplus property
disposal, and 33 percent of parts distribution, to name a few examples.
In evaluating functions for outsourcing, the DOD has suggested some
initiatives to make it successful. Changes to the traditional mode of approach for
contracting out services need to be made including early investigation or market
research of services available in the marketplace. Similarly, well written,
performance based statements of work that contain output orientated measures
of performance are essential. Typically, DOD has focused efforts on input-
orientated specifications. Also, the issue of relocating personnel or helping
personnel transition to the changing environment is essential to maintain current
levels of performance and motivation.
Construction Management Outsourcing for Federal Agencies
There has been success utilizing construction management (CM) services
from the private sector by several federal agencies, including the General
Services Administration (GSA), Department of Energy (DOE) and the
Department of Veteran's Affairs (VA). The main reason cited by these agencies
for using private sector firms for management of their construction contracts is




The GSA has used external sources extensively in managing their
construction projects. They have used private sector firms in both the design and
construction phases of a project, including retaining firms in cases of litigation or
resolution of claims after project completion. Recently, they have awarded
construction management services for both a single, large construction and
renovation project of the ICC/USCS/CW and Ariel Rios Buildings
(approximately 160,000 gross square meters) and an indefinite quantity contract
to cover several construction projects (in the $1 million to $5 million range)
located in the National Capital Region. Both of these contracts allow for
flexibility in using the private firm for both design and construction management
throughout the contract process. [Noll 1997]
The DOE uses private sector construction management on very large, high
visibility projects. DOE contracts are typically cost-plus-award fee contracts with
CM-at-risk firms contracting directly with the contractors. Their reasons for
outsourcing construction management services are that large projects are
infrequent occurrences, there is a small DOE staff dedicated to project
management, competent contractors and subcontractors are available, and the
contractor is assigned considerable responsibility and authority.
An example of a successful project for DOE was the Advanced Photon
Source Project, consisting of one million square feet of building space at a cost of
$800 million. The facility was completed ahead of schedule and under projected
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costs. An example of a DOE project that was not as successful was the
Superconducting Super Collider Project, with a conceptual design cost of $5.32
billion. This project underwent several modifications and changes to scope
increasing the cost baseline to $8.24 billion which lead to termination of the
project by Congress. Termination costs alone amounted to $735 million. Success,
or lack thereof, was determined to be the same on both projects; project staffing
and teaming concepts built during the process. Reasons cited for the lack of
success at the Supercollider project were: lack of experience in leadership
positions, teaming was not effective, confusion between project and
customer/ laboratory organizations and trusting relationships were not built
between the DOE and the contractor. The success of the Photon Source project
was directly attributed to: the teaming between DOE and the contractor, clear
responsibilities between all parties, trusting relationships were built and
experienced personnel at all levels assigned to the project. ["Committee on
Outsourcing" 1997]
The VA has used external construction management services on several
large projects. All of their construction management services have been awarded
using a firm fixed price contract with a set number of hours for proposals. An
example of use of construction management services was on the $65 million
clinic and renovation in Honolulu. Only two personnel from the VA were
assigned to the project. All construction management was handled by a
14

contractor. The facility was completed on budget and within the assigned time
period. Some of the benefits cited by the VA for using outsourcing are: funding
for management comes from a different source, current VA staffing was not
assigned where projects were located, and outsourcing allows for greater staff
flexibility. ["Committee on Outsourcing" 1997]
Construction Management Outsourcing for DOD
Traditionally, the DOD has relied on in-house staff or the services of
another federal agency, such as the General Services Administration, Army
Corps of Engineers or NAVFAC, to oversee the design and construction of
facilities. Most of the design and virtually all of the construction has been
performed by contracted private sector firms.
The agency overseeing the design and construction is typically classified
as a support function for the DOD. In other words, the agency's mission is to
support the DOD in carrying out its mission, but is not a core competency of the
DOD. Because of the nature of the work involved in construction management
can be classified as not a core competency of the DOD, it is a prime candidate for
outsourcing.
Construction management meets the three basic requirements of the DOD
for consideration of an outsourced activity. First, the private sector has
numerous firms capable of performing construction management services from
15

initial design determination to project completion. The Engineering News
Record contains annual listings of the Top 100 firms that perform construction
management in the United States and internationally. Billings for the Top 100
for-fee firms amounted to $6.3 billion in 1996. The for-fee firms are not
financially at risk for the project and act generally as a consultant and agent for
the owner. They do not ordinarily contract directly with prime contractors.
[Tulacz "The Top 100" 1997]
Second, because of the growth of the construction management industry,
there is adequate competition in the market to keep competition as an advantage
for contracting. More and more private and public owners are turning to
construction management firms to do business. This demand has increased the
number of firms providing these services.
Finally, outsourcing construction management can bring the best value to
the government not only by introducing competition to an existing function, but
by introducing new management techniques and innovative forms of
management to the existing services provided by government forces.
This paper will focus on the outsourcing of construction management
services specifically for the U. S. Navy in an effort to meet DOD initiatives for
outsourcing and alternate ways of doing business. The feasibility, benefits and
risks of outsourcing ROICC office functions, as well as common contracting





Naval Facilities Engineering Command, or NAVFAC, manages the
planning, design, and construction of facilities for U. S. Navy activities around
the world and also for some Air Force and other DOD and federal agencies as
well. NAVFAC's annual volume of business is estimated at over $7 billion. This
includes over $3.1 billion in fixed price, competitively bid military construction
and repair contracts awarded to private businesses. About $1.9 billion is
expended at Public Works Centers, of which $814 million is in contracts awarded
within the private sector. NAVFAC and its subordinate commands employ
approximately 661 active duty Civil Engineer Corps (CEC) officers, 615 active
duty Seabees and 22,100 civilians. ["NAVFAC Facts" 1997]
NAVFAC's field activities include ten Engineering Field Divisions (EFD)
and Engineering Field Activities (EFA) that provide engineering support and
services to several hundred activities of the naval shore establishment; two
Construction Battalion Centers (CBC) for homeporting and training Seabees; and
the Naval Facilities Engineering Service Center (NFESC) providing specialized
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engineering, scientific and technical services. Appendix A contains a map for
location and structure of the EFD and EFA levels of command.
NAVFAC, in recent history, has undergone extensive restructuring to
meet downsizing requirements affecting all facets of the military. Between 1988
and 1995, NAVFAC consolidated and restructured command-wide and as a
result, decreased their size by 25 percent in the EFDs while at the same time
achieving record levels of work-in-place (WIP) and environmental clean-up.
fNAVFAC Improvement Plan 1995]
Due to decreasing budgets and personnel cutbacks, NAVFAC needs to
examine new ways of doing business to continue to effectively respond to
customer requests while still achieving the expected quality. Outsourcing
construction management for the Resident Officer in Charge of Construction
(ROICC) offices is one alternative to help meet the demands of "less people,
more work".
ROICC Offices
The EFDs and the EFAs have field offices, or ROICC offices, located at
several naval facilities in order to administer construction contracts. Contracts at
these facilities may be developed and awarded at either the EFD/EFA level or at
the local Public Works Department (PWD) level. Organizations involved in
these two processes are shown below in Figure 3.1.
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Traditionally, the ROICC office handles the contracts post-award when
the contract is awarded at the EFD/EFA level. Minimal pre-award activities are
assumed by the ROICC office and are usually limited to brief constructibility
reviews, site visit coordination, contract file setup, and initial contacts with the
key players (customer, A/E, and design manager points of contact). Personnel at
the EFD/EFA level track all coordination with funding, design development and
finalization, and contracting methods and award.























EFD Divisions in OICC Team
(Traditional Organization)
(b)
Figure 3.1. (a) Local PWD awarded contracts (b) EFD/EFA awarded contracts
For local PWD awarded contracts, the ROICC office still handles all of the
post-award functions and the same pre-award functions as they do for EFD/EFA
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awarded contracts. However, the ROICC office contracting staff may be more
involved in the pre-award activities including decisions on contracting methods,
bid openings, and specification and drawing reviews.
For dealings with the Architect/ Engineer (A/E) firms, usually an
Engineer-in-Charge (EIC) is selected at the beginning of the process to manage
the A/E contract through design and to provide coordination during
construction with the A/E. The EIC is located at the EFD/EFA level (in Code 04)
or at the local PWD level depending on how the contract was awarded and
developed. The ROICC engineer, in charge of the construction contract,
coordinates through the EIC for A/E support on Request for Information (RFI),
site visits, submittals, and change orders.
The attached Figure 3.2 is a flow chart of the functions normally handled
by the ROICC office in the post-award arena. ROICC office post-award
functions are typically the functions handled by construction management firms
in the private sector. However, construction management firms, in addition to
these post-award functions, are capable of handling pre-award functions;
including A/E contract management, acquisition planning, and other pre-award
functions.
The ROICC office is composed of several integral members of a
construction management team. The contract specialists: prepare, distribute and
evaluate the IFBs/RFPs; conduct negotiations; review and approve bonds and
20
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insurance; assist in contract interpretation; analyze claims; and, as a warranted
Contracting Officer, sign contracts and modifications. The engineers conduct the
day-to-day administration of the contract, including assuring performance in
accordance with the plans and specifications; monitoring quality, safety,
progress, and cost; providing documentation and correspondence as necessary;
and other matters pertaining to contract performance. The construction
representatives, or conreps, are responsible for inspection of construction and
quality assurance, documenting performance, coordinating contractor activities
(such as power outages), and monitoring compliance (such as Davis Bacon
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Figure 3.3. ROICC Office Organization
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ROICC office functions are applicable to private sector construction
management firms. Other than inherently governmental functions, explained
later in this chapter, the duties and responsibilities of ROICC office personnel are
easily transferred to the private sector. By outsourcing the traditional ROICC
office function, NAVFAC would hope to gain most of the benefits described in
Chapter II.
ROICC Outsourcing Feasibility
Due to mandated decreases in budgets and personnel, other methods of
doing business must be utilized in order to meet overall DOD objectives.
Outsourcing, as described in Chapter II, is a possible solution to meet some of
these objectives. ROICC offices, as are all parts of the Navy, are experiencing
mandated decreases of personnel without drops in workload. Table 3.1 is an
example of projected decreases in personnel and workload at the EFA level. The
workload, or WIP (work in place), is projected, and could easily increase with
additions of BRAC work if another round of base closures occurs. Field
personnel projections represent those personnel assigned to ROICC offices.
Fiscal Year WIP Field Personnel HQ personnel
95 $303M 162 14
96 $323M 156 12
97 $340M 138 11
98 $355M 134 11
99 $362M 130 11
Table 3.1. Projected personnel and WIP at EFA Chesapeake [Garner 1997]
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In order to meet increasing workloads, while still decreasing the number
of personnel, outsourcing can be used to "fill the gaps" of personnel losses. By
outsourcing to private construction management firms, the ROICC offices can fill
gaps left by loss of personnel. The construction administration performed by the
current ROICC offices includes basically the same skills found in the construction
management private sector. However, some requirements in management of
federal contracts might have to be taught to private sector companies. Examples
include: Davis-Bacon and Buy American Act enforcement, other clauses found
in federal contracts, and general correspondence requirements unique to federal
contract administration.
In comparing reasons for outsourcing discussed in the second chapter, it
can be found that outsourcing the ROICC (and perhaps additional functions,
such as pre-award and design firm management) office meets the requirements
for an outsourced function.
In my opinion the ROICC office is not a core function of the Navy. The
ROICC office serves to support the Navy in achieving goals of national defense.
The function is required so that the Navy is able to continually perform its
function for society, but outsourcing the function does not sacrifice the ability of
the Navy to perform. By outsourcing ROICC office duties, other governmental




Through the outsourcing of ROICC office functions, the use of emerging
technologies in construction management can be realized. The government, due
to its sheer size and enormous chain of command, is slow to change and thus
slow to adopt the newest technologies used in the market. By outsourcing to the
private sector, the Navy can hopefully realize the benefits of new technologies
through opening the ROICC office function to competition.
By contracting for services, greater control can be utilized over the
expenditure of costs and meeting WIP to personnel ratio needs for effective
management. For example, currently if the workload experiences a drop for a
year, employees will probably not be reassigned or dismissed, because of the
need in the coming year. However, in outsourcing only the services required for
a period of time are contracted for, thus greater control over WIP to personnel
ratios can be achieved.
Finally, the ROICC office meets DOD requirements (outlined in Chapter
II) for a function that may be outsourced. In other words, there is adequate
competition in the current marketplace to provide the service; it is not a core
competency; and the government should receive the best value through proper
contracting and planning of outsourcing the activity.
In the Logistic Management Institute's (LMI) study of construction
management costs for the Navy, they compared NAVFAC's activities with what
is normally done in the private sector for construction management. LMI found
24

that NAVFAC and the private sector perform, for the most part, the same
functions for a construction contract. Duties performed by ROICC offices and
the pre- and post-award functions performed in EFA/EFD, or at local PWDs, are
equivalent to those performed in the private sector. [Campbell 1996]
Inherently Governmental Functions
All ROICC office functions are capable of being outsourced; except for
those functions designated as inherently governmental. According to FAR
Subpart 7.501 an "inherently governmental function is one in which the function
is so intimately related to the public interest as to mandate performance by
government employees. It includes activities that require either the exercise of
discretion in applying government authority or making value judgments in
making decisions for the government."
While inherently governmental functions involve binding the United
States by action, policy, contract or otherwise; they do not include gathering
information for or providing advice, opinions, recommendations or ideas to
government officials. [FAR Subpart 7.501]
FAR Part 7.503.C.12 lists functions considered inherently governmental
with respect to federal procurement activities on prime contracts. Included
among these functions are: participating as a voting member on a source
selection or performance evaluation board; approving contractual documents;
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awarding contracts; administering contracts (i.e., ordering changes, accepting or
rejecting contractor services); and terminating contracts.
However, FAR Part 7.503.d lists functions that normally are not
considered inherently governmental. Included among these functions (relating
to the above prohibited functions) are: participating as technical advisors to a
source selection board or as a voting member of a source evaluation board;
providing technical evaluation of contract proposals; participating in any
situation where it might be assumed that they are agency employees or
representatives; providing inspection services; and providing assistance in
contract management.
The ROICC functions that equate the closest to inherently governmental
functions are the positions of the contracting officers and serving as voting
members on source selection boards. All other positions, including engineers,
conreps, and procurement technicians, are capable of being outsourced.
However, some engineers are given the authority to act as a Contracting Officer's
Authorized Representative (COAR) allowing a minimal (approx. $5,000)
approval of change orders. The approval of change orders is an inherently
governmental function because of the implied commitment of funds, and
therefore could not be outsourced. However, all functions relating to a contract




After award of a contract, even if the performance of that contract does
not involve an inherently governmental function, steps must be taken to protect
the public interest by the agencies playing an active, informed role in the
management of the contract. ["Inherently Governmental Functions" 1996]
Essentially, this would require NAVFAC to maintain contracting officers to
monitor the construction management contracts, not only for contract actions
(such as contract award and modifications and payments) with the separate
parties, but also to monitor the construction management contracts themselves.
Amount of oversight of the construction management contract depends on the
type of contract, size of contract, and size of construction/ design contract. This
is discussed in more detail in the next chapter.
Construction Management Costs
As with any decision to change current business practices, a cost
comparison is required in order to make an informed business decision whether
or not to institute any changes. An obvious cost associated with a decision to
outsource includes money paid to the hired contractor providing the service. In
addition, costs for soliciting bids and proposals, of choosing providers, and costs
of monitoring performance must be considered. [Finley 1989]
However, by keeping the service in-house, existing costs should be
considered, such as monitoring performance of the current system, and all costs
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associated with providing the system. Also, with shrinking budgets, providing
the service from a different "funding pot", may be the only alternative to the
current system in order to use the available funding for operations.
In choosing services to outsource, the size and scope of the services
required should be taken into account in order to keep costs at a reasonable level.
Projects should either be large dollar value contracts or a number of contracts.
This allows the private sector firm to spread their overhead and profit costs over
a distributed area keeping the overall costs of the service down. ["Committee on
Outsourcing" 1997]
A detailed cost comparison with the private sector is a difficult activity
because of differing management methods and contracting in the private sector.
In order to determine if NAVFAC was charging its customers a competitive rate
for providing construction management services, NAVFAC hired LMI. LMI
compared the NAVFAC supervision, inspection, and overhead (SIOH) rate with
costs of providing the same services that NAVFAC provides in the private sector.
In general, LMI found that the SIOH rate, which is a fixed fee, charged by
NAVFAC is competitive with the median "full-service" private sector fees.
NAVFAC also provides inherently governmental services under the SIOH
funding umbrella. According to LMI, on average private sector firms provide
only 82 percent of the services that NAVFAC as a whole provides. These
additional services include inherently governmental functions, policy
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coordination and provision of information to the Office of Management and
Budget and Congress. [Campbell 1996]
However, most of the additional services provided by NAVFAC cannot
be contracted out because they are inherently governmental. While NAVFAC
appears to charge customers a competitive fee for their services, the question
should be asked as to whether this fee covers all costs burdened by NAVFAC
and whether or not the quality expected is being delivered. For example,
NAVFAC does not charge the customers for services provided by CEC officers
(funding comes from another budgetary source); therefore costs for providing
complete NAVFAC services can be greater than the SIOH charged for each
contract. The ability of NAVFAC to handle the current WIP projections while
still decreasing the number of federal employees has to be addressed.
Contracting out some services may be the only alternative when faced with the
decreasing constraints on numbers of federal employees and budgetary
constraints.
Advantages of Outsourcing to Private Construction Management Firms
The three greatest advantages of outsourcing traditional ROICC office
duties to the private sector are: 1) contracting allows for greater flexibility in
meeting short term increases in WIP without the hiring of additional personnel
or shifting personnel from one site to another, 2) contracting can allow for
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staffing of isolated activities without having to staff a new office or keep a
minimal staff to oversee construction (ideal for base closures and isolated
activities), and 3) private sector services can be used throughout the contracting
process from A/E services through construction completion allowing for project
continuity throughout the process.
Because of current global threats and political atmosphere, the Navy is
experiencing cutbacks in funding and appropriations. Also, the military is
experiencing drawdowns of both military and civilian personnel. However,
construction workloads have not experienced the same cutbacks, and in fact, in
some cases have increased over the past few years. To meet both the
requirements of cutting personnel, while still managing the current workload,
outsourcing is a viable alternative to hiring temporary employees or shifting of
current employees. Contracts can be used to meet increasing workloads and
peaks in construction activity; while still maintaining or cutting back the current
organizational structure. The ROICC system consists of permanent government
employees which involves complicated hiring/ firing methods that are not
effective in meeting ever-changing needs of the installations that they support.
Outsourcing can also be effective when trying to meet demands at isolated
activities or for single large construction projects. Rather than setting up a one-
time ROICC office for a single project, contracting an outside firm to handle the
on-site administration could be more effective. By doing so, personnel would
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not have to be shifted from current work or other areas to meet this need. Also,
at isolated activities where there are not current ROICC office resources,
outsourcing to private firms could also be more effective for the same reasons.
The current ROICC system would require the shifting of employees from their
current positions, or the hiring of additional employees, in order to meet these
new demands.
If the outsourcing of construction management services begins at the
beginning of the project phase, then the full advantages of outsourcing this
function can be met. The current system can consist of the A/E contract being
handled by the design management division (Code 04), the construction contract
procurement handled by the contracts department (Code 02), the construction
phase managed by the construction management division (Code 05), and the
day-to-day administration managed by the ROICC office. By outsourcing early,
all of these functions (except inherently governmental functions) can be handled
by one project team provided by the contract. This would provide continuity
throughout the process and also relieve the local PWD or EFD/EFA Code 04
some workload responsibilities.
Several different types of contracts can be used to implement construction
management services into the current NAVFAC system. Through these different
contract types, different levels of governmental supervision as well as amount of
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services are required to protect government interests in the project. Chapter IV





There are many options that can be explored as to how to provide
construction management services contracted out to the private sector. Should
construction management services be used on a project by project basis, as a
"backfill" for understaffed ROICC offices, or to replace a ROICC office? Should
a cost-plus-fee, firm fixed price, or indefinite quantity contract be used? Should
services be used for the whole project process (i.e., from A/E management to
post-award construction), post award construction only, or only those services
needed (such as inspection services)? There are no easy answers to these
questions. In fact, all choices are applicable in different scenarios. One of the
advantages of using a contracted service is the flexibility to adjust that service to
changing, or particular, needs. This chapter will briefly examine how
construction management services can be used with different contract types and




With every contracting option, risks must be addressed and assessed to
determine if the risks are low enough that contracting is not a detriment to the
process. When contracting for construction management, the risks to the
government include quality of service provided, capabilities of contractor to
carry out the contract to its term, and protection of government interests.
Contractor risks for construction management contracts are minimal, providing
that they are capable of meeting contract requirements. Because the design is the
responsibility of the A/E and the construction is the responsibility of the
construction contractor, liability for these issues is generally placed on those
entities, not on the construction management firms.
The assumptions for this paper when discussing issues of contracting for
construction management services include the following:
(1) contracts for A/E services and for the construction of the project are
held between the government and entities separate from the CM
contractor.
(2) the construction management services are provided by CM-for-fee, not
CM-at-risk, arrangements. CM-for-fee firms are not financially at risk
and act as consultants for the owner. CM-at-risk firms contract out the




(3) Oversight of the construction management contract is provided by
NAVFAC contracting officers and their representatives.
The government can reduce its risk in contracting out a service by using
the source selection process/RFP process. By carefully evaluating contractors on
pre-determined factors, a competent contractor with the financial ability to
conduct the contract can be chosen. Also, by writing contract specifications
clearly delineating the responsibilities of the construction management firm,
liability and other contractual issues can be resolved before any determination of
award. In order to ease firms in the transition of doing business with their
organizations, some government agencies offer training classes (one or two day)
for their contractors on basic paperwork requirements and unusual regulations
before the start of the contract.
Source Selection vs. Brooks Act
Source selection under FAR Subpart 15.6 is different than Brooks Act
selection procedures. The Brooks Act covers selection of A/E services defined as
"professional services". Specifically, professional services of an architectural or
engineering nature are "required to be approved by a person licensed,
registered, or certified to approve such a service" [Construction Contract
Management 1994]. CM services can fall into this category, in some cases,
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currently handled as Title II services with an A/E. These services are usually
limited to inspection services during the construction performance of the
contract. However, overall CM services are not necessarily classified as
"professional services" requiring Brooks Act procedures.
Source selection procedures differ from Brooks Act procedures in several
ways. Table 4.1 [Government Contract Law 1994] lists some of the differences in
selection between the Brooks Act and source selection procedures.
Brooks Act Source Selection
Requirement is identified and
advertised.
Requirement is identified and




Solicitation states evaluation criteria.
Technical competition between
qualification statements from the A/E
firms meeting advertised criteria.
Price competition between proposals
that meet minimum requirements
stated in the solicitation.
Technical competition involving
evaluation of qualifications without
regard to price.
Competition involving evaluation and
comparison of price and other factors.
Table 4.1. Brooks Act versus Source Selection
As can be seen from Table 4.1, the main difference between the two
procedures is that the Brooks Act compares firms without regard to price while
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the source selection process compares both price and other factors in selecting a
firm.
For NAVFAC, the source selection process is best suited for the delivery
of CM services to protect government interests in both quality and cost of
services. In source selection while the lowest price may be the deciding factor,
the government may also select the source whose proposal offers the greatest, or
best, value to the government in terms of performance and other factors. This
allows for greater flexibility in the selection of contractors achieving the best
value for the government in selection.
Contractor Selection
In order to achieve the quality of services that NAVFAC provides to their
customers and to reduce the risks on the government, contractors need to be
carefully selected to fill the ROICC office functions. The use of some contract
methods, such as one step sealed bidding (IFB), are not adequate to properly
select an outsourced service while still expecting the delivery of a quality service.
As was pointed out in the second chapter, a common downfall in the outsourcing
process is a failure to pre-qualify contractors based on their past performance.
By using the source selection process by distributing a RFP, instead of the IFB
process, the chances for success are greatly increased. The RFP process
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essentially performs its own pre-qualification of the submitted offers based on
the evaluation criteria contained in each solicitation.
In order to "pre-qualify" contractors for each solicitation, Go/No Go
factors may be used. These factors essentially narrow the number of submitted
contractor proposals only to those meeting basic project requirements, such as
personnel qualifications or project specific requirements. If a proposal does not
meet these minimum requirements it is not reviewed further and is not
considered for the competitive range of proposals. Other evaluation factors are
reviewed in the technical proposals for management and project specifics.
Evaluation factors for technical proposals can differ from solicitation to
solicitation for different specialties of construction and design, but for the most
part, the basic criteria for selection remains the same in different solicitations.
These include past performance, relevant experience, key personnel
qualifications, management approach, contractor capabilities, and a
subcontracting plan. Technical and price factors are evaluated separately in
technical proposals and cost proposals, respectively. In the best value approach,
technical proposals are given a heavier weight than cost proposals.
Past Performance. Past performance is a factor used in determining the
quality of a contractor's past performance. A contractor can be asked to provide
prior evaluations from government contracts and to provide owner points of
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contact on previous projects. Contractors can also be asked for demonstrated
performance on certain services, such as constructibility reviews, performing
technical and code compliance reviews, and familiarity with other design phase
issues, as well as experience in managing and administering all aspects of the
construction phase. Information provided in the proposal as well as other
sources, such as other governmental agencies or private agencies like Dun &
Bradstreet , can be used to determine the quality of contractor proposing.
Relevant Experience. Similar to the past performance criteria, this factor
examines past projects and their relevance to the project being solicited. This
factor is useful for determining a contractor's experience with projects of an
unusual nature requiring specialized skills. Some examples include: hospital
construction, government contract experience, large construction projects,
explosive production facilities, and power plants. This factor is commonly used
as a "go/no go" factor in General Service Administration (GSA) construction
management contracts. This ensures that only those contractors with experience
relating to the type of project being solicited are eligible for evaluation.
Key Personnel Qualifications. This factor addresses how a contractor plans
on staffing the project and what the qualifications of the key personnel are. This
can include past projects relevant to the proposed project and professional
39

qualifications of the individuals. For construction management contracts, some
key personnel could include the construction manager, project engineer, and
quality assurance inspector. The overall success of a construction management
service is directly dependent on the people assigned to the project and their
abilities to manage and form working relationships with other members of the
project team. This factor alone can lead to the success or failure of a project due
to the personnel selections.
Management Approach. This factor is similar to the work methods factor
typically used in construction solicitations. This factor can include a narrative by
the contractor describing their approach in providing high quality deliverables in
a timely manner and managing construction management work. It should also
include: a project staffing plan for each phase of work (e.g. design phase,
procurement phase, construction phase, claims and testing services); all
applicable construction management functions required during the different
phases; and teaming and partnering concepts with A/E, construction contractor,
customers and NAVFAC employees.
Contractor Capabilities. Similar to the management approach factor, but on
a more general discussion on overall firm capabilities. Evaluation of this factor
relates to a contractor's ability to perform the level of work required by the
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solicitation, including: current workload and expected workload during the
period of contract performance, types of services the firm performs, sufficient
numbers of staff to perform the functions required, adequate computer
resources, and legal associations with other firms are clear and acceptable.
Subcontracting Plan. A comprehensive narrative describing the offeror's
subcontracting plan in accordance with FAR 52.219-19. The Subcontracting Plan
should describe how the contractor is going to meet subcontracting goals as
delineated in the contract. Examples of some issues include; small business and
minority-owned business goals for hiring subcontractors.
These factors are not the only factors that can be used on a solicitation.
These factors, as well as other factors, are dependent on the type of project in the
solicitation and the services required for the project. The above factors were
taken from different solicitations on GSA projects for construction management
services.
Contract Types
Different types of contracts are suitable for different projects and any
determination on the contract type should be tailored to the individual intended
use of the service. This section will briefly examine three types of contracts
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suitable for construction management (CM) services; firm fixed price (FFP),
indefinite quantity (IDQ), and cost plus award fee (CPAF). Other types of
contracts can be used, but these appear to be the most commonly used in other
federal agencies, such as the Department of Energy (DOE), Veteran's
Administration (VA) and the General Services Administration (GSA).
Firm Fixed Price. The firm fixed price (FFP) contract occurs when the
government pays a price that is not subject to any adjustment, regardless of cost
experience. [MDAC 1991] FFP contracts place the maximum amount of risk on
the contractor and give the contractor a greater incentive to control costs.
However, for CM services, the FFP contract typically contains a set number of
workhours for the contractor to price for a specific phase of the contract (phases
may be broken into options or all in the base contract). If the construction
contract time runs over the specified contract period, modifications must be
issued to account for the CM service time period. Also, typically, the hourly
costs for various services is set in the contract for the pricing of the contract and
any subsequent modifications. Payment is based on the level of effort expended
rather than results achieved. In other words, the contractor provides a specified
effort over a stated period of time.
FFP is best suited for the delivery of CM services on a specific project
where the scope and extent of services needed for a project are known. If only
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one project is to be contracted for CM services, then a FFP contract may be the
best alternative for that delivery. FFP allows for a fair and reasonable price
established at the contract award. However, a single project can contain several
different services and careful planning must be used for the writing of the
solicitation and inclusion of detailed levels of service should be specified. FFP
contracts require a more detailed specification than other contracting methods
and typically is less flexible than other methods of contracting.
Indefinite Quantity. An indefinite quantity (IDQ) contract provides for the
indefinite quantity of specific supplies or services, within stated limits, to be
delivered during a fixed period. [MDAC 1991] Deliveries of services are
scheduled by placing orders, referred to as delivery orders or task orders.
Typically, in CM services, prices are based on market prices for hourly costs for
services (adjustment factors are used as a price comparison basis for the
submitted proposals). An example of the price list, from GSA Contract
GS11P97AQD0009 - White House Project CM Services, is contained in Appendix
B. Typically IDQ contracts are used when a predetermination cannot be made as
to a definite quantity of services required. A contract minimum amount is set as
well as a maximum per delivery order.
IDQ contracts are best suited for "umbrella" coverage over a region for
CM support. The contract could be centrally managed from the EFD/EFA level
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for use in the various ROICC offices as the need arises. In this manner, the IDQ
contract can be utilized in a manner similar to the Job Order Contract (JOC) with
delivery orders placed when services are needed. This is especially applicable
for the current atmosphere of downsizing to be used as a backfill for smaller
offices experiencing increases in workloads. Through the IDQ contract, services
can be provided for the phases needed and for projects that cannot be properly
staffed with governmental employees. Disadvantages with the use of IDQ
contracts include: negotiations are required for each delivery order, and there is
no competition for a delivery order, only one source is used through the IDQ
contract which limits competition for projects after the initial award of the
contract.
Cost Plus Award Fee. In a cost-plus-award fee (CPAF) contract, the
government pays the allowable costs, a base fee (can be zero) and an award fee.
The award fee is paid in whole or part based on the subjective evaluation by the
government of the contractor's performance. Determination of the award fee is
made unilaterally and is not subject to the Disputes Clause. [MDAC 1991]
Typically, a CPAF contract is used when it is not feasible to devise objective
incentive targets. Its use supposedly will effectively motivate the contractor
toward exceptional performance and provide the government with added
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flexibility. However, added administrative costs are evidenced in a greater
requirement for supervision for invoicing and oversight.
CPAF contracts can be used in varied ways for CM services. They can be
used for a single project that is unique in nature or as a tool for a firm to manage
a complete ROICC office. By using a CPAF contract, greater flexibility can be
utilized for different CM services, up to and including running a ROICC office.
Due to changing requirements in a typical fiscal year, the ROICC office tasks can
change and by using a CPAF contract, these changes can easily be adjusted to the
contract providing they are in scope changes. However, as was stated earlier,
greater supervision requirements may be required to assure accurate billing and
provision of services.
Monitoring Outsourcing
As was discussed in Chapter III, inherently governmental functions
cannot be contracted to the private sector. This requires the government to have
personnel oversee contracts who are capable of taking contract actions for the
government. As an absolute minimum for the management of CM contracts, a
contracting officer is required to be able to approve modifications to all contracts
for the project (A/E, construction, and CM services), approve invoice payments
to all parties, award contracts, and other actions as described in Chapter III.
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The organization of a project with the use of CM services is depicted in
Figure 4.1. The CM firm serves as a consultant managing the day-to-day
activities of the A/E and construction contracts for the government. All parties
have contracts directly with the government to prevent conflicts of interest.
However, the CM firm does oversee the A/E and construction contracts to
manage project completion. Any contract actions with these entities have to be
done through the government, but the CM firm can process changes, payments
and other contractual items through the government representatives. In cases of
a design-build contract, only two entities would have a contract with the







Design A/E General Contractoi
Figure4.1. Project Organization
The number of government representatives per project depends on the
size of the project, phase of the project and the extent of use of CM services on
the project. At a minimum, a contracting officer is required to take contract
actions. Because of the inherent workload of a project, a Contracting Officer's
Authorized Representative (COAR) would probably be required for technical
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advice and to monitor the CM contract for compliance with specification
requirements. This could include attending project progress meetings, site
inspections when deemed necessary, reviewing payment recommendations for
both the design and construction parties for accuracy, and coordination with the
CM firm for contractual actions.
Overall project management should be done through the government.
This includes initial project conception (determination of project needs and
scope, other planning required including budgeting decisions) and soliciting the
CM firm. Responsible items depend on when the CM firm is awarded their
contract. For example, should the CM firm be brought on board before the A/E
contract in order to help in A/E selection; after the A/E has been selected to
manage that contract; or during design development for constructibility reviews
and to help in construction contractor selection. Any of these may be acceptable
options and need to be decided upon early in the project planning process.
In the design phase, the CM firm can serve in two different ways, as a
ROICC or as EFD/EFA design management. By replacing ROICC office
functions, the CM firm would handle constructibility reviews and early project
team coordination as well as procurement assistance. In this case, the
government would have to have personnel to manage the A/E contract and
conduct design reviews. By replacing the EFD/EFA, or local PWD, design
management, the CM firm would be responsible for coordination between the
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A/E, owners, and design review personnel, design review, scheduling, and any
value engineering. In this case the government needs to have personnel to
monitor the CM firm and to conduct any design reviews that remain with the
government (for example, fire protection and environmental reviews could
remain with the government because of specialized requirements).
In the procurement phase, the CM firm can perform burdensome tasks
such as coordination between all parties, writing and distributing of
amendments, market surveys, bid estimate, consultants for source selection
boards, writing CBD announcements, and other items as deemed necessary. Due
to the abundance of inherently governmental functions in this stage of
contracting, all of the contractual decisions would have to be made by
government employees.
In the construction phase, the CM firm handles all coordination between
the A/E, general contractor, customer, and NAVFAC representatives. The CM
firm would also handle submittal review process, inspections, RFI process,
estimation/negotiation of changes, progress payment process, schedule
compliance and review, project documentation and all other items that a ROICC
office would normally handle (see Figure 3.2) except for inherently governmental
functions. Government monitoring depends on the amount of supervision
determined to be necessary. The CM firm is normally required to submit
monthly progress reports along with progress payment requests, including any
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progress meeting notes and log updates that are included in the submission.
Government monitoring can include a COAR to attend progress meetings and
make intermittent inspections and others if determined necessary by the project
scope and complexity.
Potential Problems
As with any change in a management system, there are potential
problems that if addressed early can reduce their impact. Some problems with
outsourcing of ROICC office functions include: existing personnel issues,
training of personnel, CM firm liability, and retaining a base cadre of
experienced CEC officers. Additionally, the evaluation or benchmarking of the
performance of the CM firm as compared to government forces is very important
and should be addressed in policy and procedures.
Inherent in any outsourcing activity is the potential for loss of personnel
currently in positions performing those activities. If CM services are used to
replace entire ROICC offices, then those personnel will face dislocation. Whether
or not ROICC offices are outsourced, the numbers of personnel are declining and
actions have to be taken to ensure the ease of transition of personnel to other
jobs. DOD actions significantly eased such personnel transitions during recent
drawdowns and BRAC rounds. ["Improving Combat Edge" 1996] Several tools
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are available to ease the process of relocation of personnel, whether to another
governmental agency or outside of government service.
However, if ROICC offices are supplemented with CM services and not
replaced, then personnel problems will still exist in other forms. The largest of
these is the fear of job loss due to the use of CM services instead of government
forces. This can create a reluctance to use CM services if available, even if they
are needed to relieve workloads on government employees. This problem is not
easily solved and probably can only be relieved through open communications
between the ROICC offices and the EFD/EFA and NAVFAC levels of command.
Through communication between the field offices and headquarters as to the use
and extent of use of CM services, hopefully, fears and reluctance to use CM for
ROICC office functions when necessary would be reduced.
Proper training in the roles of the CM firm and the roles of government
with these contracts would need to be done to ease the transition in use of CM
services. The management of CM services is different from other service
management contracts. The biggest obstacle is for the government to overcome
their "need" to control every aspect in a contract. The CM firm has to be
entrusted to an extent to properly manage both the A/E on record and the
construction contractor. Only monitoring of the CM firm performance and




Training of the CM firms into the NAVFAC paperwork system might be
necessary to have a smooth process during their contract performance. This
training could be a day or two (similar to a pre-construction conference) to train
the CM firm on NAVFAC methods of business, limits of authority, ethical
conduct during contract performance and relationships with specific team
members. However, in conducting such training, the government should be
careful not to "handicap" the CM firm to doing business the government way.
This could be detrimental to the advantages of outsourcing and taking advantage
of the hired CM firm's way of doing business.
Because of the method of contracting for a CM-for-fee firm, financial
liability for the construction of the project is not a responsibility of the CM firm.
It should be spelled out in the specifications who has the liability for different
phases of construction. In other words, the A/E firm has responsibility for the
design and the construction firm has responsibility for the construction. The CM
firm is limited to managing the oversight and contract performance of these
entities. There may be occasions where the CM firm is reluctant to take action
for fear of assuming liability during construction. In such cases, the government
must ensure all parties are clear as to responsibilities and liabilities for such
events.
By outsourcing the ROICC process, the Navy loses important training
billets for their CEC officers. CEC officers require on-the-job construction
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experience to be better able to perform their duties during mobilization and
other times of conflict. Currently, CEC officers receive most of their construction
experience in the Seabees and at ROICC positions of responsibility. ROICC
offices allow CEC officers to be intimately involved in the management of
construction projects. While outsourcing ROICC would eliminate the current
billets for CEC officers, Seabee billets would still remain for training purposes,
and additional billets could be created for the management of the projects at the
Contracting Officer or COAR level of CM service supervision.
A determination of how the use of private sector firms to conduct CM
services has improved the process and whether or not it is effective is an
important measure of the outsourcing process. A comparison of outsourced
services, along some benchmarks against which to rate the performance of
services, is necessary to determine the level of performance service and if the
service is meeting the needs of the government. Whether performance is graded
through customer surveys, observations of performance, or against certain
measurements of performance such as modification percentages and claims
against the government, should be considered. How to set benchmarks and
what to measure against is a difficult process that needs further examination and





The outsourcing of ROICC office functions is a viable alternative for
NAVFAC to meet current demands to downsize and still be able to properly
manage increasing workloads in construction contract management. In order to
outsource construction mangement to the private sector, NAVFAC needs to
maintain a core group of Contracting Officers and COARs to perform inherently
governmental functions and protect the government's interest. All other ROICC
office functions are capable of being outsourced.
By outsourcing ROICC office functions, NAVFAC could meet short term
goals of reductions in federal employees, and realize the long term benefits of a
more flexible organization capable of changing with differing demands from
customers. In outsourcing, NAVFAC would hope also to realize benefits
typically found when a company outsources. Some of these benefits include:
better management of costs and control measures, introduction of newer
management technologies in the field, and project continuity from initial design
through final construction completion.
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In order to realize the benefits of outsourcing, NAVFAC has to ensure that
proper planning and coordination is done prior to any outsourcing. Open lines
of communication with all levels of the chain of command need to be maintained
with regard to the outsourcing process. Proper training, not only of government
employees monitoring construction management contracts, but of the private
sector firms, needs to be done to ensure a better transition to the use of the
outsourced service.
My recommendations based on the research done for this paper include
the following:
(1) Immediately start the process of instituting IDQ contracts for
construction management services at the EFD/EFA levels of command
to be run similar to the JOC contracts.
(2) NAVFAC begin educating employees as to the purpose and use of the
construction management contracts in the field.
(3) NAVFAC should pick a couple of projects in the coming year for use
of private sector construction management services starting at the
design management phase of the project through project completion.
(4) NAVFAC should begin investigations into outsourcing ROICC on a
wider scale to determine organizational and customer delivery effects.
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By instituting IDQ contracts now, NAVFAC can fill the short term effects
of downsizing while workloads continue to increase. This will continue to
provide customers and the Navy with the service required for construction
management.
Education of employees will ease the transition to the use of construction
management services when needed and how to monitor the contracts to ensure
quality performance.
By selecting a couple of projects to use private construction management
services from beginning to end, problem areas for future contracts could be
identified and resolved; and benefits/ costs of maintaining the service including
how to monitor the contracts can be observed. Teaming and partnering concepts
should be utilized to define roles of all contractual parties and to open lines of
communication.
By investigating how to institute outsourcing of ROICC office functions
on a wider scale, NAVFAC can determine better ways to utilize the service for
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SECTION B - SUPPLIES OR SERVICES AND PRICES/COSTS
1. General.
The Construction Manager (CM) shall provide all management,
supervision, labor, materials, supplies, and equipment (except as otherwise
provided), and shall plan, schedule, coordinate and assure effective
performance of all services described herein.
The CM must have office space available within the GSA National Capital
Region, and be able to respond to Government contacts/ communications
within 24 hours (one work day) during the day-to-day performance of this
contract.
2. Contract Executive.
The CM shall identify a Contract Executive responsible for the execution of
each Work Order, negotiating Work Order modifications for unforeseen
requirements, coordinating the efforts of Work Order teams, and acting as
the principal point of contact between the CM, Contracting Officer, and the
Contracting Officer's Authorized Representative (COR).
3. Travel.
Travel shall not be reimbursed except as provided in the following
paragraphs:
a. Projects requiring the services of the CM will be, or are expected to be,
within the geographic boundaries of the GSA National Capital
Region(NCR). The NCR includes the District of Columbia;
Montgomery and Prince Georges Counties in Maryland; the cities of
Alexandria, Falls Church and Fairfax in Virginia, and the counties of
Arlington, Fairfax, Prince William and Loudoun in Virginia. There
will be no reimbursement for travel within the GSA-NCR or between
the GSA-NCR and Baltimore, Maryland.
b. Any travel to be allowed must be authorized by the COR in advance.
The allowable travel reimbursement per visit to sites in cities or
locations outside of the GSA-NCR shall be fixed in negotiations by the
COR and the CM. In negotiating the fixed price for such travel, the
allowable per diem cost shall not exceed the rates set forth in Federal
Travel Regulations in effect at the time the work order is negotiated. In
addition, all travel by privately owned vehicle outside of the GSA-NCR
will be reimbursed based on Federal Travel Regulations mileage rates.
c. No travel reimbursement will be authorized by the COR unless the CM
provides sufficient written evidence of costs incurred, including
receipts, registers, or other information as may be required by the
COR.
4. Labor Categories and Rates.

Enter one multiplier factor and the extended contract man-hour rates to be
used for each of the respective performance periods. The GSA estimated
man-hour rates will be factored by the multiplier percentages to arrive at
the extended contract man-hour rates.
5. Hourly Labor Rates.
The extended contract man-hour rates listed by the CM must be the rates
that will be used as the basis for pricing work under this contract. Each
option period will be separately priced. In arriving at the extended contract
"*] man-hour rates, the Contractor should include anticipated allowable
overhead costs to include home office support, profit, and all direct labor
costs associated with this contract. Extended contract man-hour rates must
be quoted for all disciplines/work categories.
6. Firm Fixed Price.
The firm fixed price for Work Orders will be based on the fixed extended
contract man-hour rates, the negotiated level of effort for each category,
deliverables, and authorized travel.
7. Submittals.
Design review documents, plans, specifications, drawings and other
materials should be forwarded to the CM by the architect-engineer(s) via
overnight carrier/messenger(s) for reviews. The CM must transmit these
documents to the Government and other affected contractors by the same
means. This cost element must be factored into the fixed contract multiplier
factors/extended man-hour rates.
8. Guaranteed Minimum. See Section-F.
9. Contract Effective Period(s). See Section-F.
10. Miscellaneous Items.
Do not show separate price breakouts for the Miscellaneous Items described
in paragraph C.2(o) of Section C. This term refers to work which may be
required in support of the projects. Advance approval by GSA is required.
Such work may be required by the Government as contract modifications
under the "Changes" Clause.
11. Additional Instructions.
a. Offerors are cautioned that any offer may be rejected as nonresponsive
if it is materially unbalanced as to prices for the initial and the optional
contract periods. An offer is unbalanced when it is based on prices
which are significantly understated for some work and prices which
are significantly overstated for other work,
"s^b. Neither the CM Contractor nor its employees will be required to
prepare, sign or seal any maps or specifications as part of the contract
scope of work.
c. Offerors must propose prices for all disciplines/labor categories in
order to be considered for award. Offerors may not use pricing

alternatives which differ from these instructions.
d. Offerors must propose one multiplier (mark-up factor) for uniform
application to all of the GSA estimated man-hour rates within each
contract effective period, and enter the resulting extended contract
man-hour rates for each discipline/labor category. Do not exceed two
decimal places for the multiplier factors. Multipliers may not vary
among the projects listed at the front of Section-C. Do not enter
rounded dollar figures in the Extended Contract Man-Hour Rates
column.
e. The Contractor is required to provide its own ADP
hardware/computer equipment and software adequate to fully satisfy
all operational requirements of this contract and task orders requiring
field office operation requirements. This should be considered in
developing the price proposal as no reimbursement is authorized for
such items after award of the contract. This contract requires
computerized capabilities of the Contractor.
12. Work Orders.
Individual Work Orders will be issued as requirements occur. These orders
will specify work to be performed and will reflect the extended contract
man-hour rates in the basic contract. The terms and conditions set forth in
the basic contract will always apply. Each order will have its own price and
performance period which may extend past the expiration date of the
current basic contract effective period; however, a completion date must be
established at the original execution of each Work Order. Outstanding
Work Orders shall be performed at the rates/pricing which correlate to the
applicable basic contract period(s) in effect for their duration. Modifications
to Work Orders are controlled by the Changes Clause as to work
requirements and equitable pricing adjustments. The total amount of all
work required may not exceed the maximum contract price for the
respective base or option period in which it is ordered. After the contract
base or option period expires, the amount of work included in any
outstanding Work Order shall not be modified to enlarge its scope, unless
such modification is necessary to accomplish the tasks under the Work
Order. The basic contract may not be modified to enlarge its scope after the
expiration date of its last effective period, inclusive of options, except that
the expiration date may be extended for an aggregate total of six months.
13. Example of How Offers Will be Used to Calculate Prices:
Offerors should write (type) out the multiplier in numeric form as shown in
the example given below. The bid represents the multiplier times the
established GSA estimated man-hour rates on pages 6 through 15.
EXAMPLE: XYZ Company is bidding 5% greater than the GSA rates for




A offer of 1.05 equals 105% of the established unit prices. The resultant unit
price for principal would be $94.50 ($90.00 x 105%)
XYZ Company is bidding 5% less than the GSA rates for the initial 12-
month period. XYZ's bid for the principal would be as follows:
MULTIPLIER FACTOR: 0.95
An offer of 0.95 equals 95% of the established unit prices. The resultant unit
price for principal in group I would be $85.50 ($90.00 x 95%).
14. Bid/Offer for Basic Services
a. BID/OFFER FOR THE 12 MONTH BASE
PERIOD
State a mutiplier, for providing construction
management services for the 12 month base
period.
MULTIPLIER FACTO
• BID/OFFER FOR THE OPTION PERIOD I
State a multiplier, for providing construction
management services for the Option Period I.
. BID/OFFER FOR THE OPTION PERIOD II
State a multiplier, for providing construction
management services for the Option Period II
NOTES:
u Man-Day Rates = Extended Contract Man-hour Rates multiplied by 8.
u Basis used for man-hour rates is 2016 per annum.
u Data development and preparation requirements will be priced using the
following scheduled rates.
u If required, testimony participation will be priced using the following schedule

to the extent practicable.
u YOU MUST QUOTE A PRICE FOR THE INITIAL 12 MONTH PERIOD AS
WELL AS FOR THE OPTION PERIODS IN ORDER TO BE CONSIDERED
FOR AWARD.
u (3) PRICING OF OPTIONS:
Offerors shall price the option requirements for the two (2) additional 1 2 month
periods by assuming that the minimum hourly wages and fringe benefits
established by the Administrator, Wage and Hour Division, U.S. Department of
labor, for the initial 12 month period of performance will apply to the two(2)
additional optional 12 month periods. The minimum wage rates and fringe
benefits applicable to the initial 12 month period of performance are outlined on
Wage Determination No. 94-2104 (Rev. 7) dated November 11, 1996.
In the event the option(s) is exercised by the Government, the contract price(s)
will be adjusted upward or downward at the time the option is exercised in
accordance with FAR 52.222-43.
Offerors are cautioned that any bid/offer may be rejected as non-responsive if it
is materially unbalanced as to prices for the options and the initial contract
period. A bid/offer is unbalanced when it is based on prices which are
significantly less than cost for some work and prices which are significantly
















Mechanical Engineer - Sr.
Electrical Engineer - Sr
Structural Engineer - Sr.
Civil Engineer - Sr.
Testing Engineer - Sr.












































































Project Claims Analyst $35
Architect-Sr $55
Architect - Jr. $37
Mechanical Engineer - Sr. $65
Electrical Engineer - Sr $65
Structural Engineer - Sr. $65
Civil Engineer - Sr. $65
Testing Engineer - Sr. $53
Engineers (any) - Jr. $42
Specifications Writer $55
Geotechnical Engr. $50














Word Processor II $24
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